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• Where it is believed that names and incidents are of importance, they are augmented with 
Hanyu Pinyin (in italics) and simplified Chinese characters.
• Names of companies, organisations, policies etc. are written in italics.
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1. Introduction
With the launch of economic reforms and the opening up in 1978, China started to catch up 
with the industrial nations. During the 1980s and 90s great importance was attached to the develop-
ment of the science and educational sector. Development of the first Chinese intranet and connec -
tion to the internet became a key to developing science and economy. In 1987 the China Academic  
Network (CAnet, Zhongguo xueshu wangluo 中国学术网络) was established. In the same year the 
first  e-mail  was sent from China to the University of Karlsruhe. Full access to the internet was 
gained in 1994, and it took four more years until the internet business was booming.1 The growth 
rate of internet users is tremendous, and China soon will have the largest online community in the 
world. In January 2008 China had about 210 million internet users, being only second to the United  
States with 215 million users.2
Analysts often forget that Chinese internet users only constitute a small percentage of the popu-
lation (about 16% in December 2007).3 The internet penetration rate compared to countries like the  
USA or Japan (both above 65% in July 2007)4 is still very low. The internet market will grow as a 
large part of the population still is not connected to the worldwide web, especially in the rural areas.  
But it should be kept in mind that today’s surfers still represent an elite.5 A large proportion of inter-
net users (about 36.2% in 2007)6 hold academic degrees, while persons who enjoyed tertiary educa-
tion only make up for 6,22% of the populace.7 Besides economic aspects, western analyses often 
stress the aspect of censorship. Involvement of Western companies in content control and imprison-
ment of ‘cyber dissidents’, like Shi Tao 师涛, have been  topics of discussion for a long time.8 Re-
porters Without Borders and Amnesty International have recommended China to respect its cit-
izens’ freedom of speech. The USA, Germany and France have criticised China for its censorship 
1 Fang, Weigui, Das Internet und China: Digital sein, digitales Sein im Reich der Mitte. Hannover: Heise Zeitschriften 
Verlag GmbH & Co KG 2004. P. 2.
2 CNNIC China Internet Network Information Center (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development  
in China (January 2008). http://www.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2008/2/29/104126.pdf. P. 10. (accessed 22.05.2008)
3 CNNIC (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2008). P. 12.
4 CNNIC (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (July 2007). http://cnnic.cn/down-
load/2007/20thCNNICreport-en.pdf. P. 9-10. (accessed 15.5.2008)
5 Fang, Weigui, Das Internet und China: Digital sein, digitales Sein im Reich der Mitte. P. 1 and p. 161.
6 CNNIC (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2008). P. 18.
7 中华人民共和国国家统计局（编），《中国统计年鉴－2007：4-12  各地区按性别和受教育程度分的人口 
(2006年)》. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/html/D0412c.htm (accessed 9.5.2008)
8 Shi Tao is a Chinese journalist who has been sentenced to ten years of imprisonment in 2005 for having given away 
‘state secrets’ to an American NGO. The arrest was made possible because Yahoo! gave away his personal data. (see 




policies. According to a proposal passed in February 2007 the European Union might consider in-
ternet censorship a trade barrier.9 This could affect future negotiations with the PRC.
Literature on internet censorship in the PRC still holds the view that the Chinese government 
has successfully build a solid firewall, which can only be circumvented by using special software.  
Others hold the opinion that a system as complex as the internet cannot be censored in an effective  
way.10 As Bill Clinton put it once, trying to control the internet would be like ‘trying to nail Jello to 
the wall’.11 Some are overly enthusiastic in regard to the possible impact which the internet might 
have on the process of democratisation, by stressing the importance of its ‘feedback functionality’  
and the influx of foreign body of thought.12 Imperfect control would lead to a more open public dis-
course, which would eventually lead to the fall of China’s authoritarian regime.13
The first part of the thesis will examine the status quo of internet censorship in the PRC. Mech -
anisms which the Chinese authorities employ to censor the web will be examined, but the focus will  
rest on the non-technical aspects internet censorship. It will be explored how mechanisms of censor-
ship are becoming increasingly indirect, alongside taking a look at regulations and codes and the  
news monopoly of the Chinese state and its agencies, like Xinhua (Xinhua tongxunshe 新华通讯
社). The second part of the thesis will examine user’s reactions to internet censorship, how they ad -
apt to it, and if they circumvent technical barriers, or if they are aware of the existence of internet  
censorship. Special attention will be paid to self-censorship and self-seduction, by taking a look at  
online behaviour.
To better put into perspective the topic of internet censorship I will use the concept of Panopti-
cism, mediated by Michel Foucault, as well as media theories by Chomsky and Herman. The paper 
is based on articles and research papers, surveys, as well as online articles and papers. Online art -
icles are used throughout the paper because of their timeliness and availability, as the latest changes  
in China’s internet censorship cannot be found in traditional papers and articles.
9 Bangeman, Eric, EU may begin treating ’Net censorship as a trade barrier. 
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080227-eu-may-begin-treating-net-censorship-as-a-trade-barrier.html (accessed 
8.5.2008)
10 August, Oliver, The Great Firewall: China’s Misguided - and Futile - Attempt to Control What Happens Online. 
http://www.wired.com/print/politics/security/magazine/15-11/ff_chinafirewall (accessed 16.5.2008)
11 Wacker, Gudrun, „The Internet and censorship in China“, in Hughes Christopher R. and Wacker, Gudrun (Editors),  
China and the Internet: Politics of the digital leap forward. London: RoutledgeCurzon 2003. P. 58-82. P. 58.
12 Fang, Weigui, Das Internet und China: Digital sein, digitales Sein im Reich der Mitte. P. 143.
13 Tsui, Lokman, „The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom: Control and Regulation of the Internet in 
China“, in China Information Volume XVII, no. 2 (2003). P. 65-82. P. 66.
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2. The Great Firewall of China: Technical and Non-Technical Means of Censorship
China has one of the world’s strictest censorship regimes. Traditional media are mostly directly  
controlled by the state. Considerable progress has been made since the 1980s, and the media cer -
tainly enjoy a higher degree of autonomy than 30 years ago, but the state is not yet willing to loosen  
its tight grip on information. As with traditional media the authorities also tried to impose control  
schemes onto the new medium internet. As the Chinese internet has become bigger and more diver-
sified, and internet access has become available to more and more citizens, voices of foreign critics 
condemning censorship and internet control also have become louder by every year. This chapter  
presents research findings on how internet censorship works in the PRC, both with regard to tech-
nical means, and under the aspect of non-technical control mechanisms.
2.1 Technical Filtering and Censorship
For obvious reasons the Chinese government does not give any details of the hardware and 
software used to control the flow of information from and to China through the internet. It is well  
known that most of the traffic in China is routed through systems from Cisco Systems.14 All traffic 
has  to  pass  through  networks  of  the Ministry  of  Information  Industry (MII, Zhonghuarenmin-
gongheguo xinxi chanyebu 中华人民共和国信息产业部), whose networks create a single gateway 
to the international internet, which can be controlled more easily. 15 Only speculations can be made 
with regard to the concrete workings of software developed by Chinese companies to control the in -
ternet, but by conducting experiments researchers have understood the basic principles of the Great  
Firewall of China. Of course the Chinese state may fix loopholes found in its firewall and change 
mechanisms, but many researchers have pointed out that the basic technical principles of censorship  
cannot be changed dramatically, so that the techniques most likely will only be refined over time. 16 
According to the OpenNet Initiative most systems designed to block undesired content use three ba-
sic techniques:
”IP blocking, DNS tampering, and URL blocking using a proxy. These techniques are used to block 
access to specific WebPages, domains, or IP addresses. These methods are most frequently used where  
direct jurisdiction or control over websites are beyond the reach of authorities.“17
IP blocking,18 also known as ’packet dropping scheme‘, refers to a scheme where all traffic to a 
specific IP address based on a ’black list‘ is discarded, and therefore the content of the target ad-
14 Espiner, Tom, Cracked: The Great Firewall of China. 
http://www.silicon.com/research/specialreports/china/0,3800011742,39160084,00.htm (accessed 1.5.2008)
15 Tsui, Lokman, „The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom“. P. 68.
16 Clayton, Richard, Murdoch, Steven J. and Watson, Robert N. M., Ignoring the Great Firewall of China. 
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf (accessed 12.5.2008)
17 OpenNet Initiative (Editor), About Filtering. http://opennet.net/about-filtering (accessed 5.5.2008)
18 IP stands for Internet Protocol, a network protocol which is used to communicate over the internet. Every computer 
connected to the worldwide web has its own distinguished IP-address, which is used to identify and communicate with 
other computers and servers.
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dress becomes inaccessible. The scheme is easy to deploy and cost-effective, because modern net-
work routers feature the necessary options. Disadvantages of packet dropping are that blacklists  
have to be kept up-to-date, to ensure that sites who have moved still can be blocked and new sites  
are added on a regular basis, as well as that internet users might suffer from ’overblocking‘. All  
websites which share the same IP-address as the blacklisted website will also be blocked, which 
might lead to the undesired blocking of numerous websites not containing any sensitive content.19 It 
is hard to say how many IP-addresses are blocked in China because the blacklist is subject to fre -
quent changes and also depends on the network used to access the internet. By probing different 
websites in 2006 the OpenNet Initiative found out, that IP-addresses blocked by the two big state-
owned backbone providers China Netcom (CNC, Zhongguo wangluotongxin jituangongsi 中国网
络通信集团公司) and China Telecom (CT, Zhongguo dianxin jituangongsi 中国电信集团公司) 
were ’remarkably similar‘, but not identical.20 Sites  like Wikipedia or  the BBC’s web service are 
sometimes unblocked or only Chinese-language versions of these two portals are inaccessible, de -
pending  on  political  circumstances.  Now more  and  more  bans  are  lifted  because  of  the  2008 
Olympic Games, but this may change drastically after the games.21 Why apparently random changes 
of blocks and also unblocking of critical content might not be a disadvantage for censorship will be  
discussed in the next chapter.
Another scheme used to deny access to certain websites is known as ‘DNS tampering’,  or 
‘DNS poisoning’.22 When the Domain Name System is contacted to translate a textual address (like 
www.google.com) into a numeric IP-address (in Google’s case it would be 216.239.51.99), no an-
swer (’Site not found‘) or an incorrect answer is returned, leading the internet user to no site or to a  
different webpage.23 In 2002 users wanting to visit Google’s Chinese website were redirected to its 
Chinese competitor Baidu 百度.24 Research findings indicate that DNS tampering isn’t widely used 
to prevent users from accessing websites. Reasons for this will be discussed in the next chapter.
URL blocking using a proxy, also known as ‘content inspection scheme’, is the most sophistic-
ated means to block unwanted content. All traffic is routed through a proxy server, performing a 
check if the desired website contains sensitive content which should be blocked. Unlike DNS pois-
oning and IP blocking this method can be made extremely precise, because routing through a proxy  
19 Clayton, Richard, Ignoring the Great Firewall of China.
20 OpenNet Initiative (Editor), China (including Hong Kong). http://opennet.net/research/profiles/china (accessed 
5.5.2008)
21 SourceForge, Inc. (Editor), China Allows Access to Englisch Wikipedia. http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?
sid=08/04/06/1643223 (accessed 25.4.2008)
22 DNS stands for Domain Name System, a system which translate human-readable computer hostnames into numeric 
IP addresses.
23 Clayton, Richard, Ignoring the Great Firewall of China.
24 Fallows, James, “The Connection Has Been Reset”. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200803/chinese-firewall (ac-
cessed 14.5.2008)
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permits dynamical control over requested content and does not need static blacklists, but rather a  
list of undesired keywords. This scheme can be refined to a degree where single images and videos 
are blocked, while letting other content pass unchanged. Proxy-based blocking of content is not uni -
versally applied because coping with the entire traffic of a big network would slow down connec-
tions and lead to very high costs.25 An alternative content inspection scheme exitsts. Rather than us-
ing a proxy server this scheme uses components of an ‘Intrusion Detection System (IDS)’, which  
inspects content as it passes by and will arrange for data packets to be discarded at a firewall or will  
issue a TCP reset to close the connection. A research team based at the University of Cambridge 
found out that the Great Firewall of China employs this method, blocking connections by sending 
TCP resets to the machine requesting a website and the requested website.
“When a packet arrives at the router it is immediately placed into an appropriate queue for onward  
transmission. The packets are also passed to an out-of-band IDS device within which their content is 
inspected. If the packet is considered to be ‘bad’ by the IDS device [...] then three TCP reset packets 
[...] are generated for each endpoint and given to the router to be transmitted to their destinations.”26
After receiving the packets the desired website cannot be reached for a span of time, reaching 
from five minutes to an hour.27 The team’s assumption is that there’s not one single IDS device in-
specting the content, but rather many different devices. They also discovered that, when setting  
packet filtering firewalls on both sides of the connection to ignore the reset commands send by IDS  
device, the connection will just work fine:
“[...] by simply ignoring the packets sent by the ‘Great Firewall’, we made it entirely ineffective! This 
will doubtless disappoint its implementers.”28
It was also found out, that the firewall uses another random scheme to disrupt connections, 
known as ‘blocking with confusion’. Forged SYN/ACK packets issued by the firewall, include an  
invalid random sequence number which lets connection to the desired website fail. This strategy  
seems to appear randomly, making it rather hard to circumvent it.
It can be seen from these research findings that the Great Firewall of China is not as solid as it 
is sometimes described in the media, but uses rather well-known means to control the flow of in -
formation on the internet. But does the firewall have to be really this solid, and does the Chinese 
state have to take care of a total control over the content viewed by its citizens? There are indicators 
that show that the Chinese state gave up the idea of total control over the internet a long time ago,  
or maybe never even got this idea in the first place. How technically imperfect control over the in-
25 Clayton, Richard, Ignoring the Great Firewall of China.
26 Clayton, Richard, Ignoring the Great Firewall of China.
27 Fallows, James, “The Connection Has Been Reset”. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200803/chinese-firewall
28 Clayton, Richard, Ignoring the Great Firewall of China.
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ternet might even be helpful to the Chinese authorities and how censorship has been refined and 
changed during the last years will be discussed later in this paper.
2.2 Refining Censorship
The first part of this chapter has given a short introduction to the technical aspects of censor-
ship. This part of chapter two will examine how the Chinese government is refining censorship and 
its mechanisms by handing down censorship to private or semi-private agencies and companies. 
This chapter will examine by which means this is done and if the concept of Panopticism may be  
applied to Chinese internet censorship.
2.2.1 Laws and Regulations
The PRC has issued laws to regulate the internet and online business, and has amended them 
over time to adapt to changes and new developments. Similar to the laws of other countries, China’s  
regulations on the internet also feature restrictions and define forbidden content.
The first regulations, The Temporary Regulation for the Management of Computer Information  
Network International Connection, were promulgated in 1996, and amended in 1997 and 2000 to 
keep up with the development of the internet industry. The 2000 amendments include regulations to  
govern telecommunications and the publication of news and electronic information on the internet;  
all of them, like the Measures for the Administration of Internet information services (Hulianwang 
xinxi fuwu guanli banfa 互联网信息服务管理办法)29, include a list of forbidden content.30 One dis-
tinct feature of this list of forbidden content,  which is based on Regulations Governing the Admin-
istration of the Publishing Industry (Chuban guanli tiaoli 出版管理条例)31, is that the list is drafted 
extremely vague. For example, any content that
“[...] endangers national security, discloses state secrets, subverts the government, destroys the unity 
of the country. [...] Damages the honour and the interests of the State. [...] disturbs social order, under -
mines social stability [...]”32
is forbidden.
It can be seen that these leave a large space of interpretation. Points like ‘subverting the gov-
ernment’ or ‘destroying the unity of the country’ can be interpreted in the light of the situation, and  
may be used as reasons to imprison dissidents. Because Internet Content Providers (ICP) and Inter-
net Service Providers (ISP) are left with the obligation to ‘clean’ their websites, they are also left  
with the problem of implementing the rules and regulations of the PRC. It is rather unclear where  
29 国务院（编），《互联网信息服务管理办法》. http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/b/2000-09-25/17920.shtml 
(accessed 21.5.2008)
30 Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 62.
31 国务院（编），《出版管理条例》. http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2001-12/31/content_220668.htm 
(accessed 21.5.2008)
32 Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 62.
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borderlines may be drawn, which content may be regarded as ‘healthy’, and which may be in con-
flict with the basic principles of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or endanger national security.  
The result of these vague regulations has been insecurity for the media staff, making them conduct a  
stricter self-censorship to avoid conflicts with authorities. 33 China is  a  country still  in the early 
stages of rule of law, but it is not due to lack of expertise that some regulations are drafted in such a 
vague manner. Uncertainty in regulations on users and content providers is most likely intended.  
Regulations issued to control the latest developments of the internet, like restrictions on blogs and 
video websites, also lead to more confusion about what may be posted and what is forbidden.34 Reg-
ulations drafted to control newly emerging phenomena, like (video-)blogs35, may reflect the Chinese 
authorities falling back into old patterns of behaviour, overreacting to gain back control over public  
opinion. But this may also be seen as one method to keep users and companies confused, and force 
them to stay on the safe site. According to Anne Stevenson-Yang the problem is
“[...] that the important rules in China are not the published ones. [...] China’s system of censorship fo-
cuses on before-the-fact control of organizations that communicate with the public.”36
In many cases, ‘policy, not statute is the true law of the land in China’, therefore people operat-
ing businesses in China have to be cautious to policy changes and informal letters and internal doc -
uments, expressing the will of the CCP.37 This ‘before-the-fact’ control of organisations will be sub-
ject of further discussion.
2.2.2 Panopticism: A Short Introduction
Panoticism is a concept mediated by French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984), based 
on  a  prison  model  (the  Panopticon)  invented  by  English  philosopher  Jeremy  Bentham (1748-
1832).38 Panopticism gained widespread attention through Foucault in the 1970s, and was used in 
many social and cultural analyses throughout the 1980s and 90s.39 The concept obtained  some at-
tention in connection with analyses of internet monitoring schemes, data collection mechanisms and  
also with regard to censorship mechanisms, because today’s technical standards allow a greater de -
gree of observation, a point which is essential for the functioning panoptical mechanisms. 40 In Ber-
tham’s prison inmates are detained in an annular construction, and watched from a tower built in the  
33 Scharping, Thomas, “Administration, Censorship and Control in the Chinese media: The State of the Art”, in China 
aktuell 4/2007. P. 96-118. P. 107.
34 Pluta, Werner, Lasst hundert Blogs blühen. http://www.golem.de/0801/57004.html
and Pluta, Werner, China beschränkt Online-Videos. http://www.golem.de/0801/56806.html (both accessed 29.5.2008)
35 In 2007 about 49.35 million Chinese were writing blogs, and about 76.9% of users were watching online video 
(CNNIC (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2008). P. 52 and P. 56)
36 Stevenson-Yang, Anne, “Can China Co-opt the Web?”, in Far Eastern Economic Review October 2005. P. 6-10. P. 7.
37 Stevenson-Yang, Anne, “Can China Co-opt the Web?”, P. 7.
38 Tsui, Lokman, „The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom“. P. 66.
39 Boyne, Roy, “Post-Panopticism”. P. 294.
40 Boyne, Roy, “Post-Panopticism”. P. 296-297.
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middle of the construction. The inmates live in separated cells not able to reach out to each other.  
They do not know when they are watched, they only know that they might be watched at any time. 41 
As Foucault puts it:
„He [the prisoner] is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject of com-
munication. [...] the divisions of the ring, those separated cells, imply a lateral invisibility. And this in-
visibility is a guarantee of order.“42
The Panopticon is seen as a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism, an ‘expression in a  
pure form of realizable technology of power’, but also a model applicable to our modern society. 43 
Foucault does not say that the permanent exercise of power is necessary to remind the inmates that  
they are under control. Rather, power should be visible and unverifiable, which makes its exercise 
effective and induces an uncertainty among the watched, so that the prisoner ‘has to act as if he is 
under constant surveillance all the time, even though such surveillance is not physically possible for  
the single warden’.44 Surveillance should be ‘permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in  
its action’.45 This principle can also be seen in the Great Firewall. The firewall is not inviolable; it 
can be circumvented by different technical means. Blocks are also not permanent in their effects be -
cause blacklisted sites change rather frequently. However, continuity can be observed regarding its  
effects, as will be shown in chapter three. In the following discourse it will be made clear which  
role the concept of Panopticism plays in today’s internet censorship in the PRC.
2.2.3 The Role of the Chinese Media
The following paragraph will survey the status quo of Chinese online media, and how their or-
ganisation and structure helps the Chinese state to censor the internet. Most online media outlets are 
still handled like traditional print media in law, so at times this section will refer to to regulations 
about the Chinese newspaper market. Rules regarding online and offline media do not differ signi -
ficantly.
The press and the media are still defined as ‘the mouthpiece of the Party’, and their duty is to 
propagate the Party line; the Western concept of freedom of the press is explicitly renounced, and 
newspapers (and their online outlets) are conceived as organs of CCP party organisations.46 The 
main supplier of information in China is Xinhua, the state-owned news agency. Xinhua has a mono-
poly on the domestic news service in mainland China, as all news media are required to use it as the  
41 Foucault, Michel, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Random House, Inc. 1995. P. 200.
42 Foucault, Michel, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. P. 200.
43 Boyne, Roy, “Post-Panopticism”, in Economy and Society Volume 29 Number 2 May 2000. P. 285-307. P. 293.
44 Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 60.
45 Foucault, Michel, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. P. 201.
46 Scharping, Thomas, “Administration, Censorship and Control in the Chinese media”. P. 98.
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only news source.47 Autonomous production of content by the media is allowed, but within strict 
limits.  Besides  delivering news to  the Chinese media, Xinhua also publishes about  40 different 
journals and newspapers, more than 400 books each year, and, most important in the context of this  
paper, has an extensive internet service.48 Xinhua transmits two categories of reports; leading stories 
and commentaries for mandatory reprinting, or ordinary reports for optional use. The news agency  
holds a specific monopoly on topics like
“[...] Party and government policies, important meetings, leadership activities, and talks on both do-
mestic and foreign affairs, appointments, dismissals and deaths of important leaders.”49
As long  as  media  outlets  only  republish  news  from Xinhua no  further  (self-)censorship  is 
needed, as the news are censored already. Many websites will copy news from Xinhua not only to 
circumvent  conflicts  with  the  government  but  also  to  reduce  personnel  costs.  But  competition 
between state-owned and private media outlets is becoming fierce as a result of the growth of the 
Chinese market, and of World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession, which will cause more and 
more foreign media companies to enter the mainland market. Private enterprises naturally depend  
on the revenue they generate. Given that subsidies are declining Chinese state-owned companies  
also increasingly depend on advertising, which forces them to adapt to the market and compete with  
foreign companies.50 Today privately owned websites like Sina.com (Xinlang xinwen zhongxin 新浪
新闻中心), 163.com (Wangyi 网易) and Youku.com (Youku 优酷), rank among the most visited sites 
in China, while sites like People.com.cn (Renminwang 人民网) attract considerably fewer users.51 
‘Privatisation’ of internet content production, through users and online communities, also poses a  
new threat to the official media, further diversifying content production and establishing new com-
petition for the traditional media.52 Private internet companies no longer wait for Xinhua news to be 
published but engage in news reporting to attract readers. When the Chinese embassy in Belgrade  
was bombed in 1999, private news sites did not wait to receive the official version of the news, but 
published their own articles. They also reported on an explosion in a school building in Jiangxi, 
contradicting official information.53 Official media are becoming more commercial, especially local 
47 Tang Wenfang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China. Stanford: Stanford University Press 2005. P. 81.
48 Scharping, Thomas, “Administration, Censorship and Control in the Chinese media”. P. 101.
49 Scharping, Thomas, “Administration, Censorship and Control in the Chinese media”. P. 104.
50 Tang Wenfang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China. P. 86.
51 According to Alexa Traffic Rankings for China (Alexa Internet, Inc. (Editor), Top Sites China. http://www.alexa.-
com/site/ds/top_sites?cc=CN&ts_mode=country&lang=none (accessed 6.6.2008))
52 Tang Wenfang, Public Opinion and Political Change in China. P. 86.
53 Chan, Joesph Man, ”Administrative boundaries and media marketization: A comparative analysis of the newspaper, 
TV and Internet markets in China”, in Lee, Chin-Chuan (Editor), Chinese Media, Global Contexts. London: 
RouledgeCourzon 2003. P. 159-176. P. 170.
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newspapers (and their online versions), which publish reports and comments divergent from official 
news.54
One problem is that with the ongoing commercialisation of the Chinese media and the increas-
ing dependence from advertising revenues many media companies will move to the ‘lighter’ field of  
entertainment and so-called ‘soft news’, staying away from critical journalism. Some authors argue 
that in the case of China moving away from propaganda to any thematic field may still be an im-
provement.55 Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model  however indicates that  commercialised 
media can still be used as a tool of propaganda. According to them five news filters can be found in  
the commercialised media:
“(1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-me-
dia firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of the me-
dia on information provided by government, business, and ‘experts’ funded and approved by these 
primary sources and agents of power; (4) ‘flak’ as means of disciplining the media; and (5) ‘anticom-
munism’ as a national religion and control mechanism.”56 
These filters refer to the American media market of the 1970s and 80s, but they may exist in the 
current Chinese media market. The first filter, ‘size, ownership, and profit orientation of the mass  
media’, describes how working-class media in Great Britain were hindered by the government, first  
by using laws and prosecutions, and later, when this method proved ineffective, by forces of the lib -
eral market.57 The PRC’s government also tried to constrain the number of entities being able to do  
internet business, by drafting laws and regulations which were designed to shut down individual  
websites, and only let big capital-driven websites survive.58 Everybody who wants to run an ‘Inter-
net information service’, has to meet the requirements of ‘value-added telecommunication opera-
tions’:
“(1) the operator should be a company set up according to law; (2) the operator should possess ad-
equate funds and specialized staff for the operations; (3) the operator should have the credibility or ca-
pacity to provide long-term services for the customers.”59
These regulations effectively hinder individuals and companies who do not possess ‘adequate 
funds’ to run websites and web services, thus promoting the conglomeration and concentration of 
big companies. The latest regulations permit individuals to post videos. Video-sites now may only  
54 McCormick, Barret L. and Liu, Qing, “Globalization and the Chinese media”, in Lee, Chin-Chuan (Editor), Chinese 
Media, Global Contexts. London: RouledgeCourzon 2003. P. 139-157. P. 141.
55 McCormick, Barret L. and Liu, Qing, “Globalization and the Chinese media”. P. 150.
56 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. 
London: Vintage Books 1994. P. 2.
57 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 3.
58 Sun, Xupei, “Accession to the WTO and the Development of China’s Digital Media”, in Zhang, Junhua and Woesler, 
Martin (Editors), China’s Digital Dream: The Impact of the Internet on Chinese Society. Bochum: The University Press 
Bochum 2002. P. 109-128. P. 118.
59 Sun, Xupei, “Accession to the WTO and the Development of China’s Digital Media”. P. 118.
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be run by accredited companies. The first filter may not only be proven valid for individual and  
commercial websites, but also for government-owned websites, like online outlets of newspapers 
and magazines. As mentioned above, subsidies are declining, or even completely cut off, so that  
these outlets also have to generate revenue in order to survive on the market. Since the 1990s a 
trend of conglomeration can be seen among the Chinese media, with the establishment of 24 differ-
ent press groups till 2001 in China, like the Guangzhou Daily Press (Guangzhou ribao baoye jituan 
广州日报报业集团) and Guangming Daily Press Group (Guangming ribao baoye jituan 光明日报
报业集团).60 Similar to centralisation in western markets few big media companies posses large 
shares of the market.61 Media companies tend to search new income sources, for example by going 
public, generating pressure by shareholders who want to see the companies generate revenue, for-
cing them to turn towards strictly market-orientated objectives. 62 Dependence on government rela-
tions poses a special problem with the still feeble implementation of rule of law in China and the  
common use of informal channels to do business.63 This multitude of dependencies, the trends to 
commercialisation and conglomeration,  prove that  the first  filter  is  also valid in the context  of  
Chinese  media,  providing a  further  layer  of  censorship.  Because  emphasis  is  put  on economic 
achievement, rather than on journalistic qualities, media companies not only experience pressure 
from official site, but also have to regulate their content, based on what private interest parties de-
mand.
The second filter, ‘advertising as primary income source of the mass media’, can also be found 
in the modern Chinese media world. As has been mentioned above, subsidies from the government  
have been withdrawn or dropped, thus making advertisement the main source of income for most  
media outlets, state-owned or not.
“With advertising, the free market does not yield a neutral system in which final buyer choice decides.  
The advertisers’ choices influence media prosperity and survival.”64
In a system where media companies largely depend on advertisement, ad companies acquire a 
‘de facto licensing authority’65, similar to the licensing authority of the Chinese government. New 
filters come into play, further scaling down the field of news which may be covered, because ad -
vertisers wish to attract target audiences.66 Business news are often ‘bought outright by arrange-
ments with journalist’. Also public relations firms that use ‘soft bribes’ have grown up with the  
60 Sun, Xupei, “Accession to the WTO and the Development of China’s Digital Media”. P. 121.
61 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 5.
62 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 11-12.
63 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 13.
64 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 14.
65 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 14.
66 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 16.
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commercialisation of the market.67 Starting from the 1990s a ‘tabloidization’ can be witnessed in the 
Chinese newspaper market, where ‘evening papers’ attract larger audiences than the ‘morning pa -
pers’ (also known as ‘organ papers’).68 Evening papers generally publish more soft  news (news 
about sports, scandals, and celebrities). This move to non-political content may also be witnessed in 
the field of online media. Chinese webportals feature a lot of soft news on their front page, besides  
the official news from Xinhua they’re required to publish. Even CCP mouthpiece website People.-
com.cn tried to attract readers by reporting in February and March 2008 the sex photo scandal of 
Hong Kong based singer and movie star Edison Chen (Chen Guanxi 陈冠希).69 The pressure to at-
tract readers induced a lack of substantial difference between different media outlets. In the case of 
Chinese media this becomes even more visible as policies already constrain what can be published, 
and economic pressure puts even more constraints on content. When surfing Chinese web sites or 
searching for Chinese articles, many users will realise that the same articles are posted on different  
websites. These articles do not only originate from Xinhua, but are also copied from other websites 
to cover ‘hot topics’ and generate more hits for one’s own web service.70
The third filter is called ‘sourcing of mass media news’. According to Chomsky and Herman,  
the media tend to publish official news given out by presumably trustworthy sources, like govern-
ment officials and business corporations because news companies need material to publish, and 
publishing pre-processed material will decrease costs.71 Chomsky criticises that the U.S. Airforce 
and the Pentagon produce magazines and information brochures themselves and that U.S. chamber 
and thousands of state and local chambers of commerce engage in lobbying activities and public-re -
lations.72 According to him the danger is that
“[...] the large bureaucracies of the powerful subsidize the mass media, and gain special access by 
their contribution to reducing the media’s costs of acquiring the raw materials of,  and producing, 
news. The large entities that provide this subsidy become ‘routine’ news sources and have privileged 
access to the gates. Non-routine sources must struggle for access [...].”73
The Chinese system already displays these factors, as there is only one official source to get  
news  for  non-government  companies, Xinhua.74 Because there is  only one official  news source, 
companies don’t have to engage in news scouting. Privileged access to news sources can also be  
67 Stevenson-Yang, Anne, “China’s Online Mobs: The New Red Guard?”. P. 53.
68 McCormick, Barret L. and Liu, Qing, “Globalization and the Chinese media”. P. 151-152.
69 高原，《MaggieQ首度回应“艳照门”：与陈冠希完全无关》. 
http://hm.people.com.cn/GB/83174/7034214.html (accessed 6.6.2008)
70 Stevenson-Yang, Anne, “China’s Online Mobs: The New Red Guard?”, in Far Eastern Economic Review October  
2006. P. 53-57. P. 54.
71 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 18-19.
72 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 20-21.
73 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 22.
74 Stevenson-Yang, Anne, “China’s Online Mobs: The New Red Guard?”. P. 55.
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seen in the Chinese system, as government-owned companies have rather good relationships with  
governmental news sources, while private media companies, and especially foreign news compan-
ies, have to struggle to get licenses for the Chinese market.75 Investigating news in China is diffi-
cult; companies have to obtain licenses, and foreign companies also have to employ Chinese per-
sonnel to do the job. Reporters are often hindered, especially when conducting interviews. There-
fore relying on Xinhua saves a lot of trouble. Reporting critically about governmental sources may 
even lead to broadcasting and business licenses being revoked. The third filter is valid in the context  
of Chinese media, even though it works different from the U.S. system. The Chinese state may use  
tougher punishments to silence the media, while the U.S. system largely relies on binding the media 
via subsidies.
The fourth filter, ‘flak as means of disciplining the media’, is defined as:
“‘Flak’ refers to negative responses to a media statement or programs. It may take the form of letters, 
telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress, and other modes of 
complaint, threat, and punitive action.”76
‘Flak’ in the Chinese context may take rather severe forms, even as harsh as imprisonment.  
Withdrawal of media licenses may effectively end the business of whole companies, but individuals 
can also be exposed to ‘flak’. Many dissidents, like Shi Tao, have been imprisoned during the last 
years for publishing dissident opinions on the internet. 52 individuals (among them journalists and  
writers) were known to be imprisoned in 2006 for online activities.77
The fifth filter, ‘anticommunism’, can not be directly applied to the PRC. ‘Anticommunism’ in  
the USA of the 1980s is described as a ‘political-control mechanism’, even as a kind of ‘religion’, 
which is used to foster support for the government and its views.78 A similar kind of ‘national reli-
gion’ can be found in China. After Mao’s death in 1976, communist ideology lost lots of its attract-
iveness. Attempts have been made to reactivate (Neo-)Confucianism values, and to establish a more 
civilised and harmonious society, but so far the CCP has only succeeded in positioning itself as a  
nationalist precursor.79 Therefore nationalism may be seen as a kind of new state religion. National-
ist feelings are no longer suppressed, they’re even stirred up to a certain degree, to give the people a  
way of ‘letting off steam’.80 Discussion forums on nationalist topics, like the Strengthening the Na-
75 Wu, Yuwen, Panel 6: How does China deal with foreign and peripheral news media? http://www.beijing2008confe-
rence.com/articles.php?id=134 (accessed 28.4.2008)
76 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 26.
77 OpenNet Initiative (Editor), China (including Hong Kong). http://opennet.net/research/profiles/china
78 Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam, Manufactoring Consent. P. 29.
79 Giese, Karsten, “Freier Diskurs oder perfekter Überwachungsstaat? Identity Work im chinesischen Internet”, in  
China aktuell 1/2005. P. 35-51. P. 35.
80 Fang, Weigui, Das Internet und China: Digital sein, digitales Sein im Reich der Mitte. P. 139.
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tion Forum (Qiangguo luntan 强国论坛), are less likely to be shut down.81 The role of nationalism 
in China’s online culture will be shown in chapter three.
As has been shown, all five filters may be transferred to today’s PRC. The Chinese media mar -
ket faces pressure from both sides: governmental and private. The market has been liberalised and 
private actors have mushroomed, but even though competition between different types of media 
outlets exists, the Chinese media still are heavily regulated. Over-regulation can be seen in the sheer  
amount of institutions who claim rights to watch over internet companies and their regulatory body.  
Besides the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP, Zhonghuarenmingongheguo 
xinwen chuban zongshu 中华人民共和国新闻出版总署) and the State Administration of Radio,  
Film and Television (SARFT, Guojia guangbo dianyingshi zongju 国家广播电影视总局), which 
also watches the traditional media, about 14 different agencies claim the right to regulate companies  
doing online business, among them the Ministry of Information Industry and the Ministry of Public 
Security (Zhonghuarenmingongheguo gong’anbu 中华人民共和国公安部).82 Also most foreign-in-
vested companies and a large part of their Chinese counterparts, are forbidden from engaging in the  
generation of editorial content; editorial staff must be employed by wholly Chinese-owned compan -
ies, making it more easy for the Chinese government to control its activities. 83 Demands of investors 
also have to be met, making it more difficult to find topics that may be published.
2.2.4 Media Associations
Another way to delegate responsibility for censoring the internet is the formation of media as-
sociations. An example is given by the Beijing Association of Online Media (BAOM, Beijing wan-
gluo meiti xiehui 北京网络媒体协会), which was founded in 2004 and has prominent members 
like the big internet portals Yahoo! China (Zhongguo Yahu 中国雅虎) and Sina, as well as ISP Sohu 
(Souhu 搜狐).84 According to an article by David Bandurski, BAOM, which was founded as a trade 
association in the first place, plays an active role in censoring content through a 200-strong team of 
internet  monitors,  targeting  pornographic  and  violent  as  well  as  politically  sensitive  content.85 
Chinese journalist and blogger Zhao Jing 赵京 sees in this kind of de-centralised control an evolu-
tion of the orthodox internet censorship scheme of the CCP.86 While  the Great Firewall already 
blocks large parts of unwanted content, a lot of news can still bypass the block or be accessed by 
circumventing the firewall.  The control  exercised by associations  like BAOM, may serve as  a  
81 Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 70.
82 Scharping, Thomas, “Administration, Censorship and Control in the Chinese media”. P. 101-103.
83 Stevenson-Yang, Anne, “Can China Co-opt the Web?”, P. 9.
84 北京网络媒体协会（编），《理事名单》. http://baom.sina.com.cn/2/2005/0514/27.html (accessed 22.5.2008)
85 Bandurski, David, “Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet”. in Far Eastern Economic Review December 2007. P. 18-
21. P. 18.
86 Bandurski, David, “Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet”. P. 19.
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second line of control. Searching blogs, BBS entries, message boards, and privately set up websites  
for unwanted and sensitive content, can effectively avoid that messages with ‘unhealthy’ content 
spread among users. By holding the ISPs and ICPs accountable for censorship the Chinese govern-
ment distributes the financial pressure to different entities, making censorship more cost-efficient 
and presumably more effective because of the greater technical knowledge of private companies. 
The Chinese blogger Hong Bo states:
“The issue now is that the amount of information available on the Web is growing, so that it can’t be  
controlled relying solely on government supervision.”87
This distribution of responsibility perfectly corresponds with the model of Panopticism. The 
higher the number of temporary and anonymous observers, the greater the risk of being watched, 
the greater the anxious awareness people have of being observed.88 Of course companies do not re-
veal information on how many internet monitors are employed to watch forums and BBS-sites, but  
Chinese netizens will sense that some content they posted is regarded as inappropriate when it is de-
leted from a BBS or forum by an administrator. They will therefore ‘learn by doing’ how they 
should behave online. The popular social network Myspace (Juyou 聚友) applies content filters that 
return the message ‘Sorry, the article you want to publish may contain inappropriate content. Please  
alter the inappropriate content, and publish it once more. Thank you.’89, when entering key words 
like ‘Dalai Lama’ or ‘Taiwan Independence’.90 People who want to set up blogs whose names con-
tain words like ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ on the Chinese version of MSN Spaces will see a 
message telling them that ‘the title must not contain prohibited language, such as profanity. Please 
type a different title’91. Users will learn to alter the content they want to post. 92 Even though large 
parts of these responses are generated automatically users will get the idea that they are under con-
stant surveillance, which eventually will lead them to alter their behaviour, so that they will not get  
into conflict with the system again. Self-discipline is regarded as inseparable from laws and regula -
tions, leaving it to the content provider and user to regulate their behaviour, or otherwise face sanc-
tions.93
It is not known to what extend media associations are intertwined with the government. Insider  
information suggests that there is a very high degree of co-operation between the Beijing govern-
87 Bandurski, David, “Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet”. P. 20.
88 Foucault, Michel, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. P. 202.
89 很抱歉，您将要发布的文章可能包含不适当的内容。请删除该不当内容，然后再发布。谢谢。
90 Texyt (Editor), MySpace now available in China - minus politics and religion. 
http://texyt.com/China+MySpace+censorship+politics+religion+064+monitor (accessed 30.5.2008)
91 标题不能包含禁止的语言，例如亵渎的语言。请键入一个不同的标题。
92 MacKinnon, Rebecca, Screenshots of Censorship. http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/?p=238 (accessed 30.5.2008)
93 Giese, Karsten and Müller, Constanze, “Ethisch-moralische Grenzen öffentlicher Kommunikation - vernachlässigte 
Dimension im Diskurs um Internetzensur in China”, in China aktuell 4/2007. P. 74-95. P. 90.
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ment and the BAOM, making BAOM nothing more than a ‘mere functionary’ of the Beijing gov-
ernment, with internet ‘monitorers’ on the government’s payroll.94 The same can be assumed for 
other media co-operations. Because China’s Ministry of Information Industry has the right to issue 
and withdraw licenses for companies which offer online information services, membership in media  
associations is seen as more or less mandatory for holders of ICP licenses. 95 Censorship, presented 
as voluntary act of ‘corporate civic virtue’, is regarded as coercive by critics, because no media  
company wants to be singled out as laggard and take a chance to lose its license.96 Media associ-
ations and alliances first were only set up in Beijing in 2004, where many Chinese internet compan -
ies have their  principal office,  but Shenzhen followed the example of BAOM and initiated the 
Shenzhen Association of Online Media (Shenzhen wangluo meiti xiehui 深圳网络媒体协会), in 
2006.97 One of the well-known members of this alliance is Tencent (Tengxun 腾讯), a company run-
ning China’s most popular instant messaging service ‘QQ’.98 Instant messaging through QQ also 
has become subject to monitoring, making it difficult to exchange dissident opinions.
Proposals issued by BAOM indicate that the focus of this trade association is shifting towards  
self-policing to clean up the web. The association and its members want to target content which  
contradicts ‘social morality and Chinese traditional virtues’, as well as eradicate ‘pornographic and 
violent’ content, which is in line with president Hu Jintao’s 湖锦涛 campaign for a civilised web 
which was started in 2006.99 As is often the case, the fight against pornography was put forward, 
while other content was only vaguely labelled as ‘unhealthy’ or against ‘traditional virtues’. As 
mentioned in  paragraph 2.2.1,  the vague wording of  laws and regulations is  not  a  flaw of  the 
Chinese censorship regime but a strength, because ICPs and ISPs will try to stay on the safe site, by 
censoring more content than maybe necessary, than to take a chance by not censoring enough. Be -
sides media alliances, schools and universities have also initiated ‘voluntary’ control over content 
posted on their websites and forums. Control is exercised by teams of students whose task is to 
guide  internet  users  in  their  behaviour  and delete  undesired content. 100 The Internet  Society  of  
China (ISC, Zhongguo hulianwang xiehui 中国互联网协会) drafted a ‘Public Pledge of Self-Regu-
lation and Professional Ethics for China Internet Industry’. It states that it wants to ‘establish a self-
regulating mechanism for China’s Internet Industry’, by ‘monitor[ing] the information publicized  
94 Bandurski, David, “Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet”. P. 19.
95 Bandurski, David, “Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet”. P. 19.
96 French, Howard W., As Chinese Students Go Online, Little Sister Is Watching. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/09/
world/asia/09internet.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin (accessed 26.6.08)
97 China CSR (Editor), Shenzhen Online Media Form Self-Discipline Alliance. 
http://www.chinacsr.com/2006/07/20/614-shenzhen-online-media-form-self-discipline-alliance/ (accessed 24.5.2008)
98 Tencent, Inc. (Editor), Tencent-About Tencent. http://www.tencent.com/about/about_e.shtml (accessed 24.5.2008)
99 Bandurski, David, “Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet”. P. 18 and 20.
100 French, Howard W., As Chinese Students Go Online, Little Sister Is Watching.
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by users on websites according to law and remove the harmful information promptly’, ‘encouraging  
people to use the Internet in an ethical way [...] and reject the spread of harmful information’. 101 The 
pledge has been signed by different members of the ISC, including newspapers like the People’s  
Daily (Renmin ribao 人民日报), and educational institutions like Peking University (Beijing daxue 
北京大学), but also by foreign-sino co-operations, like Yahoo! China.102 When defining which con-
tent should be removed from the web, the pledge refers to Chinese law, as well as to Chinese cus -
toms and ethics, which are not defined in detail, indicating a wide range of topics which could be 
censored and removed.
As can be seen, the responsibility for censorship has been spread to a wide base of entities:  
private, semi-private and state-owned agencies, which is perfectly in line with the panoptical model.  
A higher number of observers means a higher risk of being caught for the observed, making them  
even more cautious not to break the existing rules and laws.103 Even though there are now more en-
tities censoring and examining content, this does not mean that the Chinese government has lost  
control over what can be written online, and what may not be posted, because the concept of Panop -
ticism may also be applied to agencies that already exert surveillance:
”In this central tower, the director may spy on all the employees that he has under his orders: [...] he 
will be able to judge them continuously,  alter their behaviour,  impose upon them the methods he 
thinks best“104
The Chinese central  government and its  ministries can be seen as the supervising director,  
whereas media associations like the BAOM, media companies, ISPs and ICPs that operate websites 
and online services, can be regarded as the employees, who watch the masses, but at the same time 
are also being watched and regulated. Because the CCP still has party cells in many companies and 
production units (danwei 单位), it still has many possibilities to exercise control over the agencies 
that carry out censorship and content control, although it can be argued that most Chinese see mem -
bership in the CCP only as a way to rise up in society. 
Last but not least, distribution of censorship to media companies may not only help to generate  
a more complex and effective system of censorship, but may also eliminate one of the technical bot-
tlenecks of  the Great Firewall: controlling content through proxy servers, the most sophisticated 
way of controlling content, as mentioned above, considerably slows down internet traffic. But when 
101 Internet Society of China (Editor), Public Pledge of Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics for China Internet  
Industry. http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca278881.htm (accessed 29.5.2008)
102 Internet Society of China (Editor), Member. http://www.isc.org.cn/isc_e/member.php (accessed 29.5.2008)
and Human Rights Watch (Editor), “Race to the Bottom”: Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship: II.  
How Censorship Works in China: A Brief Overview. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/3.htm (accessed 
22.5.2008)
103 Foucault, Michel, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. P. 202.
104 Foucault, Michel, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. P. 204.
- 18 -
in-depth analysis and censorship of content is passed over to the content provider site there are no 
more slow-downs. Local web control schemes by media associations are thought to be a ‘fourth 
tier’ of internet censorship, besides user self-censorship, corporate complicity and governmental  
legal and propaganda controls.105
105 Bandurski, David, “Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet”. P. 21.
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3. The Chinese Internet User
This chapter will discuss if Chinese internet users are aware of internet censorship, how they 
react to it, and what possible countermeasures they might take.
3.1 Survey in Chongqing and Beijing
This part of the thesis is based on a survey I conducted from March to April 2008, as well as on 
a survey by the Chinese Network Information Center. My survey was conducted in internet cafés 
(so called wangba 网吧) in Chongqing, in the Shapingba 沙坪坝 university district, and in Beijing 
on the campus of the Peking University.106 Besides, I randomly interviewed mostly young people. 
The respondents to this survey were limited to 100 people. Some surveys could not be used, be-
cause they were accidentally filled out by Korean and Japanese students (12 surveys were of no  
use). The average age of participants in this survey was 23 years. Most participants had a good edu-
cational background. But as most Chinese internet users today still have an educational background 
that is above average,107 findings from this survey can be applied to the bigger group of young 
Chinese internet users, and most findings may also be backed up by data of other surveys.
Besides general questions about age, educational background, gender, favoured computer oper-
ating system and internet browser, how often and where people go online, particular questions were  
posed to determine online behaviour and attitude towards internet censorship. Questions about their  
online behaviour involved their favourite activities and websites, as well  as what kind of news  
mainly were they interested in when going online. Specific questions regarded search engine usage,  
their satisfaction with search results, and problems that occurred when performing internet searches.  
Questions were posed in a rather broad way in order not to alienate respondents and not to alarm 
authorities. For example, participants were asked if problems occurred when using search engines,  
and not if problems occurred when searching for politically sensitive terms like ‘democracy’ or  
‘Tiananmen’. Only questions 16) to 17.3) were more or less directly focused on the respondent’s at-
titude towards censorship and privacy policy.
Not only outcomes of the survey are important. Reactions of participants and internet café own-
ers not presented in the survey are not less important, because they allow to draw conclusions about 
awareness of censorship and the possible attitude towards this phenomenon. Most internet café 
owners’ had no objection against this survey, but they told me not to bother users who obviously 
had no time or no interest to participate. Three internet café owners said they did not want me to  
conduct this survey, and one owner first agreed, but after I had handed out the papers, told me to 
leave as soon as everyone had returned the survey. All owners or supervisory staff wanted to know  
106 The survey (in English and Chinese) has been attached to the appendix (see pages 40 and 41).
107 CNNIC (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2008). P. 18.
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why I was conducting the survey, but surprisingly nobody asked if I had a permit to do so. Reluct-
ant wangba owners aside, the biggest problem when carrying out the survey were the internet café 
users themselves. Many users were busy playing online games, and simply could not be asked to 
take part in the survey. Another part of the internet users refused to take part in the survey, because  
they ‘had no time’. In my opinion fear of governmental reprisals was not the driving force behind  
their refusal; rather most users did not want to waste the money they had paid to use the internet  
café. Thus responses from certain user groups, mainly heavy gamers, cannot be found in the survey, 
which should be kept in mind.
3.2 Awareness of Internet Censorship
When talking about censorship of the internet in China, it should be once more made clear that 
most Westerners and most Chinese have a different view on this topic. Western criticism on Chinese 
internet control mainly focuses on the censorship of politically sensible topics and the constraints 
put on free speech, but most Chinese associate internet control with the ban of pornographic and 
other ‘unhealthy’ content.108 A survey, conducted by a team of the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences (CASS, Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan 中国社会科学院) in 2007, found out that 85% of re-
spondents thought that the internet should be controlled by the Chinese government, while putting 
emphasis on the control of pornographic (87%) and violent (86%) content, as well as the control of 
spam mail (83%), advertisements (66%) and slander against individuals (64%). Only 41% said that 
political content should be controlled.109 My own research findings are consistent with the CASS 
survey, as most respondents agreed that content should be controlled (84 out of 100 agreed). 81 re -
sponded to the question which content should be controlled: only 6 people said that political content  
should be controlled, 6 people thought that websites, that spread viruses should be forbidden, but 33 
respondents said that violent content should be controlled, and even 54 respondents said that porno-
graphic content should be controlled.110 19 people did not answer this question. Responses reflect 
how the official discussion in China mainly centres on ‘online poisons’, like pornography, 111 there-
fore creating support for a more restrictive censorship regime. This is further proof of the idea of a 
Panopticon at work. What is worrying is, that the prison inmates, the Chinese netizens, have intern -
alised behaviour patterns, and react how the state expects them to.112 When I talked to some young 
Chinese about Edison Chen’s sex photo scandal they all expressed that they wanted to see the pho-
tos. When I asked them why they had not yet downloaded them, all of then answered that it would 
108 Fallows, Deborah, Most Chinese Say They Approve of Government Internet Control. 
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_China_Internet_2008.pdf (accessed 17.5.2008)
109 Fallows, Deborah, Most Chinese Say They Approve of Government Internet Control.
110 Respondents could give multiple answers to this question.
111 Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 66.
112 Foucault, Michel, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. P. 201.
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be of no use to search for the photos because the government would already have shut down all 
websites and BBS offering them. But a quick search revealed that there were many foreign as well 
as Chinese websites still offering the photos. This shows once more, that internet users have adap-
ted to censorship by internalising. Because it is always put forward that pornographic content is for-
bidden, and certainly lots of websites featuring ‘unhealthy’ content have been shut down, users nat-
urally assume that certain images or articles will automatically be removed by the government cen-
sors, whereas in reality lots of forbidden content may be accessed without any problem. When  
searching for pictures of boats on the Yangtze River (Changjiang 长江), I stumbled upon pictures 
of half-naked and naked women, which also could be considered pornographic. Upon further re-
search I discovered, that when entering terms like ‘body art’ (renti yishu 人体艺术), Baidu yielded 
many results leading to websites like www.muwen.com (Muwen caijing 牧文财经). This site offers 
a large archive of more or less artistic pictures featuring female nudity.113 I was rather surprised that 
this kind of website could be freely accessed from a normal internet connection in China, but I was 
even more  surprised to  find out  that  some Chinese  friends  whom I  asked if  there  were  many  
webpages like Muwen, said they never had expected that there would be websites like this in China. 
When I asked them if they had tried to search for this kind of content before, they replied they had -
n’t, repeating the argument that they expected this kind of content would be blocked by the Chinese 
government. This shows that repetition of slogans against ‘online poisons’ have deeply dug into the  
minds of the youth, making it unnecessary for the government to implement a perfect system of  
content control.
As has been shown, netizens are certainly aware that certain topics cannot be touched, and that 
specific content, like pornographic and violent content, is filtered by the Chinese government. But it  
is arguable if Chinese internet users know about all aspects of internet censorship. The two ex-
amples I have given above show that many users assume that internet content control is more potent  
than it is in reality, which equals a self-confinement of the user. As some sites are only blocked tem-
porarily, some sites become unreachable due to bottlenecks in international traffic, and some sites 
are unreachable because of blocks the user is confused about which sites he may access and which 
not.114 The user cannot distinguish between sites that have been blocked by the government and 
sites which have become unavailable because of traffic problems, because there is no specific feed-
back for blocked websites.115 This is also why DNS tampering is not used more often: redirects to  
other pages would tell the user that websites are actively blocked. Temporary lifts of blocks and  
their reinstatement also discourage netizens from visiting these sites, because they cannot be re-
113 See appendix (page 42).
114 Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 66.
115 Fallows, James, “The Connection Has Been Reset”. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200803/chinese-firewall
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garded as reliable sources. Some critical sites may even be unblocked, like the online encyclopaedia  
Wikipedia. Because of their frequent inaccessibility they could not develop a solid user base, and in 
the meantime Chinese alternatives, like Baidu Baike (百度百科), became available. In this context 
it should also be mentioned how the Chinese use search engines, and how search engines work in  
China. Because the internet is composed by billions of webpages search engines are indispensable 
tools to find one’s way through this giant data jungle. 72.4% of all Chinese netizens use  search en-
gines, while for 7.4% of netizens search engines are the ‘first leg of journey’ into the internet, in 
other words the first website they will visit when accessing the internet will be a search engine. 116 
China’s government  knows this,  and has prompted search engine manufacturers like Baidu and 
Google to censor the results displayed by their search engines. What impact this might have on the 
reception of censorship among Chinese is showed by web statistics. Both sites rank among the top  
five sites in China.117 My survey also shows that most Chinese use Baidu (77 users), followed by 
Google (37 users). Both engines filter politically sensitive results from search results. But there ex-
ists one small difference: while Baidu never tells that results have been filtered, Google displays a 
short sentence at the end of the page, telling the user that ‘Because of local laws and policies, part  
of the results couldn’t be displayed’ 118. According to my survey, 84% of users are satisfied with the 
results of Baidu and Google, which indicates that most of them are not aware that part of their quer-
ies might be filtered and results might not be displayed. It is questionable if Chinese internet users  
are aware of the dimension of censorship in China, especially in regard to man-power and involve -
ment of non-state actors. They experience control when going online in internet cafés, where they  
have to show their ID cards, and when they have to register their ID to participate in certain online  
discussion,119 but most are unaware that there are supposedly some thousand ‘volunteers’ patrolling 
BBS and forums, deleting inappropriate content.120 Many students  of  the Shanghai Normal Uni-
versity (Shanghai shifan daxue 上海师范大学) were surprised to hear that they were monitored by 
their own classmates when going online on the campus. 121 On the one hand the Chinese government 
wants the people to know that it will enforce internet content control, but on the other hand it wants  
to leave users in the dark about man-power and technical means involved, creating an atmosphere  
where the user is more likely to censor himself.
116 CNNIC (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2008). P. 43.
117 Alexa Internet, Inc. (Editor), Top Sites China. http://www.alexa.com/site/ds/top_sites?
cc=CN&ts_mode=country&lang=none
118 据当地法律法规和政策，部分搜索结果未予显示。(See also appendix (page 43))
119 Scharping, Thomas, “Administration, Censorship and Control in the Chinese media”. P. 108-109.
120 Bandurski, David, “Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet”. P. 21.
121 French, Howard W., As Chinese Students Go Online, Little Sister Is Watching.
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Because most people associate internet content control and censorship with ‘online poisons’ 
and not the censorship of political opinions and believes, it is not surprising that most Chinese sup-
port internet content control through the government. Regarding the answers to the question be-
cause of whom the internet should be controlled, congruence with statements of PRC officials could  
be found. 70% of respondents said that the internet should be controlled to protect ‘small children’, 
‘adolescents’ and ‘students’, while only 10% were of the opinion that the internet should be cen-
sored for everyone. When justifying the use of online control and censorship the CCP always puts 
its role as protector of the weak and helpless forward, ‘children, women, national minorities, the 
common people’,122 to create bigger support for this kind of policies.
The  number  of  ‘cyber  dissidents’ in  China  can  only  be  estimated.  According  to Reporters  
Without Borders, about 51 cyber dissidents were imprisoned in 2008.123 Most of these cases are not 
made public. But sometimes big cases become the focus of China’s state-owned media.
“Police forces and courts only need to become active sporadically if high-profile arrests and sentences 
can be made to constitute an effective deterrence by demonstrating the risks associated with dissident 
behaviour.”124
This strategy is known in China as ‘Kill the chicken to scare the monkeys’125, and fits well into 
the concept of Panopticism. Making high-profile arrests from time to time, like the case of Huang 
Qi 黄琦 and his website www.6-4tianwang.com,126 reminds internet users that observation through 
authorities is not bogus, and that they have to stick to norms of behaviour. 
3.3 Media Consumption and Self-Seduction
As mentioned in the second chapter the Chinese media market has been growing since the 
1980s and 90s, and even today the market still keeps growing. Chinese media have become more 
diversified, and private media companies have entered the Chinese market, offering a broader range 
of contents. Mouth-piece newspapers and websites are facing the competition with private sites and  
are behaving in increasingly market-orientated ways. This of course changes the way in which the 
Chinese consume media products, and their attitude towards the official and the private media. In  
the context of this paper it is of interest what kind of content Chinese internet users consume and 
how the consumption of certain media and content might lead to a kind of self-seduction, similar to  
self-censorship.
122 Stevenson-Yang, Anne, “Can China Co-opt the Web?”, P. 8.
123 Reporters Without Borders (Editor), China - Annual report 2008. http://www.rsf.org/print.php3?id_article=25650 
(accessed 17.6.2008)
124 Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 68.
125 杀鸡给猴看。Make an example out of someone (by punishing them) to frighten others.
126 Huang Qi’s established a website for relatives of missing persons, which he received official praise for. But when 
his website commemorated the events that occured in Tiananmen Square on 3-4 June 1989, his website was shut down 
and he was arrested. (See Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 65.)
- 24 -
According to the CNNIC January 2008 survey, about 73.6% of Chinese internet users have 
watched online news, and about 1/5 of users first look up news when going online. Checking online 
news ranks third after online music and instant messaging.127 The survey I conducted shows similar 
findings, with online news ranking in the first place (75 users), followed by chatting with friends 
(74 users) and downloading music (65 users). It is also worth mentioning that 41 users said they  
actively write blogs, and 36 users said they also like to play online games. These statements can be 
backed up by official data, which states that 59.3% of netizens play online games and 23.5% of  
users regularly update their personal blog.128
Next I examined the consumption of online news, and which sources are the most trusted by 
Chinese internet users. According to my survey most internet users are interested in national (65  
users) and international news (65 users), and are also interested in entertainment news (61 users).  
Less netizens show interest in local news (43 users) and sports (40 users). Political news scored  
lowest with only 30 users showing interest. A study on media malaise suggest that not the medium 
but the content of transported by a medium may have effects on political mobilisation,129 therefore 
observing what Chinese internet users consume may be helpful to understand possible alienating ef -
fects. CNNIC information suggests that that the belief in online news among Chinese internet users  
is quite low, with only 51.3% believing in online news, 130 other statistics from CASS even suggest 
that only 30% of online news is regarded as trustworthy.131 The same survey states that users ‘over-
whelmingly’ trust information on government websites, more than any other kind of information.
“Three-quarters of respondents deemed reliable most or all the information on government websites, 
compared with 46% for pages from established media, 28% for results from search engines, 11% for 
content on bulletin boards and in advertisements, 4% for information from individuals’ web pages, 
and 3% for postings in chat rooms.”132
These statements contradict  my own findings and experience in China to a certain degree.  
When talking to Chinese friends and students about websites they normally visit to inform them-
selves, most of them said they would never look at pages of official party media (this may be reflec-
ted in the relatively low trust of 46% in ‘established media’), but they also said they would never 
consult official government websites for information. Most of them turn to privately-owned web-
sites like Sina.com, or news sites from Hong Kong, which they think can report more freely. The  
majority of respondents in my survey also stated that they used privately-owned websites like Sin-
127 CNNIC (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2008). P. 50-51.
128 CNNIC (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2008). P. 52.
129 Newton, Kenneth, “Mass Media Effects: Mobilization or Media Malaise?”, in British Journal of Political Science,  
Vol. 29, No. 4 (Oct. 1999). P. 577-599. P. 594.
130 CNNIC (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2008). P. 51.
131 Fallows, Deborah, Most Chinese Say They Approve of Government Internet Control.
132 Fallows, Deborah, Most Chinese Say They Approve of Government Internet Control.
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a.com (27%) and Google.cn (23% ) as their web portals,133 while no one stated he would use a state-
owned website. This shows a large distrust in official news, which contradicts findings of the offi-
cial survey by CASS. One reason explaining this difference, may be that respondents did not an-
swer according to their true feelings out of fear of reprisals. Anyhow statistics show that privately-
owned websites are the ones that attract most users.134 Reasons driving people to these websites are 
manifold, but the two main reasons are that users distrust established official media, and that the 
content provided by these sites is richer and more diversified than the content provided by tradition -
al news outlets. As Joseph Man Chan puts it:
“They [the non-Party press] owe their appeal to their emphasis on social issues and the provision of 
useful daily information and entertainment.”135
But as has been already discussed above, the newspaper and online market still is heavily regu-
lated, with content being generated by privately-owned companies still having to be approved by  
the state. So content on privately-owned websites does not differ by a large degree from content on 
state-owned websites. News on both kinds of sites are still mainly taken over from Xinhua, so that 
the assumption from users they might get less censored news when visiting sites like Sina.com, 
might be misleading. Interpersonal communication has also gained importance, with about 81.4%  
of users using instant messaging services like QQ and MSN,136 and blogging being a widespread 
phenomenon especially among young Chinese internet users.137 Many netizens regard blogs and 
chats as a guarantor for unfiltered and authentic stories and news. Anne Stevenson-Yang talks about 
an ‘online mob dynamic in which a blog can fuel a sudden social fire’. 138 Users swarm to the hottest 
BBS, blog, chat room or website to talk about the newest topics, largely avoiding official sources.  
The Beijing 2005 protests in against the publishing of a Japanese textbook that airbrushed Japanese  
atrocities in World War II was largely driven by an enraged online community and websites copying  
and spreading the news about this book.139 This way of communication may of course be misused 
by government officials as well as by advertisement companies which pay people who post favour-
able to the leadership.140 Some of these rallies may even have been stirred up by the Chinese gov-
ernment, to give the people a way to let off some steam, because first the government let people ex-
press their feelings, but after some time all of these rallies were cut off from official site. Most ral-
133 Webportals are sites which users first visit when going online.
134 Alexa Internet, Inc. (Editor), Top Sites China.
135 Chan, Joesph Man, ”Administrative boundaries and media marketization”. P. 164.
136 CNNIC (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2008). P. 42.
137 CNNIC China Internet Network Information Center (Editor), CNNIC Released “2007 Research Report of China 
Youth Internet Behaviours”. http://www.cnnic.cn/html/Dir/2008/04/29/5127.htm (accessed 22.5.2008)
138 Stevenson-Yang, Anne, “China’s Online Mobs: The New Red Guard?”. P. 57.
139 Stevenson-Yang, Anne, “China’s Online Mobs: The New Red Guard?”. P. 56-57.
140 Bandurski, David, “Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet”. P. 21.
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lies that are not immediately ended by the government have a nationalistic undertone, with paroles  
in favour of the government.
It should be kept in mind, that blogs and interpersonal communication may lead to activities  
like rallying against the Japanese text book, or boycotting the Carrefour supermarket chain, but that 
most young Chinese internet users are mostly interested in non-political topics, like ‘entertainment,  
sports, to be star fans, foods and tourism’.141 Top-ranking blogs on blogs.sina.com.cn (Xinlang boke  
新浪博客) are mostly written by stars or are generally of personal nature. 142 This shows the mech-
anism of self-seduction at work. Many Chinese internet users tend to be more interested in soft 
news,  like  rumours  about  stars,  instead of  politics  and social  problems.  According to  statistics  
59.3% of  Chinese  netizens  play  online  games,  with  the  rate  being  considerably  higher  among 
people with low income, low education level and young age.143 Self-seduction in the Chinese con-
text also amounts to being a mechanism of self-protection, leading the internet user away from pos-
sibly dangerous topics, similar to the mechanism of self-censorship used among big internet service  
and content providers. Not engaging in politically sensitive discussions and not posting critical con-
tent is reinforced by the perception that one might be under surveillance, no matter if he goes online  
within his own four walls or in an internet café. This mechanism is also reinforced by the choice of 
content offered by internet content providers, that is noticeably tabloidised.
3.4 Countermeasures
Which countermeasures are used by Chinese internet users who are aware that they are being 
watched and who want to get access to restricted information? There is a wide range of strategies 
available to the Chinese internet user on how to circumvent blocks, and how to surf the internet an -
onymously.
3.4.1 Proxy Servers
The simplest and most convenient way of getting access to restricted information is by using 
so-called proxy servers.144 There are lots of ways to redirect traffic to international proxies, either 
via telling the browsing software to re-route its traffic through a specific IP-address, or by surfing to  
proxy web pages that provide a detour to non-accepted sites.145 Many Chinese internet users know 
141 CNNIC (Editor), CNNIC Released “2007 Research Report of China Youth Internet Behaviours”
142 SINA Corporation (Editor), 《新浪博客总流量排行》. http://blog.sina.com.cn/lm/top/rank/ (accessed 24.6.2008)
143 CNNIC (Editor), Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (January 2008). P. 52-54.
144 A proxy server is a server (a computer system or an application program) which forwards requests from clients to 
other servers. Proxy servers that are placed outside of China, may connect to otherwise blocked servers and deliver  
content to users within the Great Firewall.
145 Woesler, Martin, “Internet censorship focus: ‘Human Rights not found’ in the Chinese web”, in Zhang, Junhua and 
Woesler, Martin (Editors), China’s Digital Dream: The Impact of the Internet on Chinese Society. Bochum: The 
University Press Bochum 2002. P. 237-267. P. 257.
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what proxy servers are,146 30% of Chinese internet users reported to have used proxies before, and 
10% do so on a regular basis.147 Lists of proxy servers are said to circulate among internet users, 
and to be forwarded via e-mail.148
Although proxy servers are rather easy to use, even for users without a very high level of tech-
nical knowledge, it is questionable if they are really widely used among Chinese netizens. Although 
many users claimed to know what a proxy is, only few acknowledged that they had used one be -
fore.149 Different factors might prevent users from accessing restricted information through proxies. 
Because addresses of proxy servers can be blocked, just like any other webservice, users have con-
stantly stay up-to-date, to get the newest addresses of unblocked proxies. Most proxies also work  
rather slowly, so that connections take very long to establish, or even time out before they are estab -
lished.150 Commercial actors have been discouraged to operate proxy servers in the climate follow-
ing the 9/11 attacks,151 therefore non-profit projects have to stand in, lacking fiscal power to provide 
higher  bandwidth  services.  While  the  problems  mentioned  above  are  of  technical  nature,  the  
concept of Panopticism comes also into play when looking at issues that may prevent Chinese users 
from accessing restricted content through proxies. It is said that Chinese agencies set up fake prox-
ies to gather data about internet users who show dissident behaviour, and even circulated lists with 
fake proxy servers.152 It is questionable if the Chinese government really engages in baiting internet 
users to use fake proxies, or if spreading such rumour is done on purpose to dissuade users from cir-
cumventing internet  blocks.  According to  Lokman Tsui,  rumours  about  fake proxies  (so called 
‘honey pots’) result in paranoia, which causes users to suspect proxy servers to be booby-trapped:
“Whether these fake proxy servers ‘really’ exist hardly matters anymore, reminding one of the charac-
teristics of the Panopticon, where it  is  equally immaterial  whether the guard is  truly watching or 
not.”153
3.4.2 Encryption Technology and Virtual Private Networks
More sophisticated means to circumvent blocks and online censorship are also available in  
China. Encryption is a way to protect data (for example e-mails) from being spied on by third  
parties. Computer programs, like the e-mail encryption software Pretty Good Privacy,154 and its free 
146 According to the survey I conducted 57% of respondents know what a proxy server is.
147 McCormick, Barret L. and Liu, Qing, “Globalization and the Chinese media”. P. 145.
148 Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 71.
149 According to the survey I conducted 57% know what a proxy server is, but only 36% have used one before.
150 Tsui, Lokman, „The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom“. P. 74.
151 Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 71-72.
152 Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 71.
153 Tsui, Lokman, „The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom“. P. 74.
154 Zimmermann, Philip, Phil Zimmermann’s Homepage. 
http://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/background/index.html (accessed 13.6.2008)
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implementations, are readily available for download. China tried to gain control over encryption  
mechanisms by passing new regulations in 1999, but because of the strong opposition from western 
companies like Microsoft the ‘measure [was] considerably watered down’.155
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)156 provide a way to get unlimited access to information. Most 
VPNs encrypt the data transfer between the server providing the data and the user requesting the 
data, therefore making it impossible for censors to see which websites are requested. VPNs are a 
necessity  for  most  banks  and companies  doing  business  in  China,  making it  unlikely  that  the  
Chinese government will crack down on them.157 Different from proxies, VPNs are almost never 
free of charge, which makes this service uninteresting or even unaffordable for most Chinese net-
izens.
Beside cost factors, why is encryption technology not used more often among Chinese internet 
users? According to my survey only 45 users thought that going online anonymously was import, 
while 53 did not regard anonymity as import. Only 17 users did know means to go online anonym-
ously, 29 users said they don not know any means, and the rest did not answer this question. The 
main reason that encryption technology is not employed, may be that people using encryption tech-
nology represent a minority. Users might suspect that sending encrypted e-mails or accessing web-
sites through encrypted channels may attract the attention of the government in an environment  
where encrypted connections are not standard.158 Because the user only can suspect that the con-
trolling agencies may look for encrypted connections and e-mails, the mechanism of self-censorship  
once more comes into play. Rather than taking the risk of being exposed, and investigated upon, 
most users will stay away from these technical means of privacy protection.
“Once again, visibility of the subject normalizes behaviour.”159
One reason, often overlooked in the academic discussion, might also be that most Chinese just 
do not consider their e-mails and other data worthy of strong protection. Someone who took part in 
my survey said he does not need to protect his privacy, because he does not do any bad things. En-
crypting e-mails is also extensive, as all contacts have to get keys to decrypt the messages, therefore  
making communication more complex and less intuitive. Even in the west, where more people have 
access to the internet, encryption software is not widely used when privately surfing the web.
155 Wacker, Gudrun, “The Internet and censorship in China”. P. 71.
156 VPNs work similar to proxy servers, but being more secure, often having advanced security features, like content 
encryption and authentication mechanisms.
157 Fallows, James, “The Connection Has Been Reset”. http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200803/chinese-firewall
158 Tsui, Lokman, „The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom“. P. 75.
and Clayton, Richard, Ignoring the Great Firewall of China. www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf
159 Tsui, Lokman, „The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom“. P. 75.
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3.4.3 Peer-to-Peer Software
The  newest  method to  circumvent  censorship  are  so-called  peer-to-peer  (P2P)  networks.160 
There are different projects, like Freenet, Peekabooty, Triangle Boy and Tor, which work in similar 
ways. Peekabooty, Tor and Triangle Boy rely on proxy servers, while Freenet enables ‘anonymous 
sharing’ of documents. The main advantage of P2P networks is that
“In principle, every node can function as a ‘server,’ and each and every one would have to be blocked  
in order to block the whole service, making it hard to uphold censorship.”161
One of the flaws of P2P networks is that software has to be spread through traditional channels 
like websites and e-mail, meaning that if websites or mails are blocked, the software cannot be  
spread among the users. When probing some websites in February and March 2008, I successfully  
visited  the  Chinese  homepage  of  the Tor  Project,162 which  surprisingly  was  not  blocked.  The 
homepage even features directions in simplified Chinese on how to install and activate Tor. Why 
can this website be still accessed? It has been reported that the Chinese government routinely blocks 
e-mails requesting peers for Triangle Boy, and even blocked Triangle Boy nodes, but other software 
seems to stay under the radar.163 Software with a small user base, like Freenet and Tor, might not be 
regarded as a threat by the government. As Karsten Giese pointed out, dissident behaviour and opin-
ions are tolerated as long as they are isolated and not discussed in public.164 Because network speeds 
largely depend on volunteers who dedicate their bandwidth to these projects requesting websites 
and documents  through these  networks  is  extremely  slow,  even slower  than  accessing  through 
proxy servers, therefore making them worthless for everyday usage.
Predominance of certain software may also have to do with the low level of proxy and P2P us-
age. The survey I conducted, shows that most Chinese internet users use the standard combination 
of Microsoft Windows and Internet Explorer, and only a small minority use alternative browsers and 
operating systems, making it unlikely that they use software like Tor, which interacts better with al-
ternative browsers like Mozilla Firefox. According to the survey only 25% of internet users use al-
ternative browsers, like Firefox and Opera, while the vast majority uses a combination of Windows 
with the standard browser Internet Explorer.
160 A peer-to-peer network is a decentralised network, where every each node is a peer, as opposed to a centralised  
client-server network.
161 Tsui, Lokman, „The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom“. P. 75.
162 Tor Project, Inc., The (Editor), Tor: 匿名在线. http://www.torproject.org/index.html.zh-cn (accessed 15.3.2008)
163 Tsui, Lokman, „The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom“. P. 75.
164 Giese, Karsten, “Freier Diskurs oder perfekter Überwachungsstaat? Identity Work im chinesischen Internet”. P. 48.
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3.4.4 Language as Countermeasure
Besides technical  means to circumvent  censorship mechanisms, Chinese internet  users also 
have developed linguistic strategies to evade censorship. They use homonyms to prevent online fil-
ters from finding critical texts or split critical discussions among several non related headlines, so 
that readers themselves have to piece together parts of the puzzle. 165 Users also use numbers which 
transport certain meanings, often derived from local dialects, so that it can be hard to understand for  
non-initiated  people  what  the  users  are  talking  about.166 Alphabetic  characters  are  also  used  to 
shorten certain expressions, making the language used by Chinese internet users more complicated 
to control and censor.167 Using a kind of coded language has long been a tradition in China, and may 
circumvent automatic censorship, but still can be censored by human controllers, and leaves the  
door wide open to arbitrariness by the state.168 Another principle commonly used in political sensit-
ive discussions is “Pointing at the bald head to curse the monk” 169, meaning that authors will criti-
cise certain aspects of a topic that may have nothing to do with the issue he really wants to address,  
leaving it up to the reader to reconstruct the issues he really wants to address. 170 These strategies 
show that the Chinese have internalised particular behaviour patterns to evade conflict with the 
state. But, as a study conducted by Karsten Giese suggests, panoptical behaviour cannot be con-
cluded for the whole of China’s netizens. Older panellists are to self-censor themselves more often, 
while younger internet users choose a more direct way of communication, no matter what they talk  
about. 
165 Giese, Karsten, “Freier Diskurs oder perfekter Überwachungsstaat? Identity Work im chinesischen Internet”. P. 47.
166 Fang, Weigui, Das Internet und China: Digital sein, digitales Sein im Reich der Mitte. P. 108.
167 Fang, Weigui, Das Internet und China: Digital sein, digitales Sein im Reich der Mitte. P. 105-106.
168 Giese, Karsten, “Freier Diskurs oder perfekter Überwachungsstaat? Identity Work im chinesischen Internet”. P. 47.
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4. Conclusion
This thesis has observed the status quo of China’s internet censorship. Its underlying assump -
tion was that the technical implementation of censorship may not be as perfect as it is assumed in  
the West, and that the CCP may instead rely on ‘discipline-mechanisms’ as Panopticism.
Chapter two has proven how the Great Firewall of China is not as complex and impenetrable 
as it is sometimes assumed, that it relies on rather simple principles, and can be circumvented eas -
ily. But chapter two and three have also shown that these technical imperfections may not hamper  
the effectiveness of censorship. Rather than trying to control every bit of information, China’s gov-
ernment has changed the approach from censorship to more self-censorship. First of all censorship  
is delegated to other entities, like private enterprises, as well as state-owned companies and educa-
tional institutions, leaving them with the duties to ‘clean’ the web according to vaguely drafted  
laws,  regulations and informal notifications.  Because of the vague wording of most regulations 
companies and institutions have to impose a strict self-censorship. Most of them will censor more  
content than may be necessary to evade conflict with the state. Media associations are useful tools  
for the Chinese state to group internet companies and force them to impose so called self-regula-
tions. It has also been shown that besides pressure from officials and the government most media 
companies also face pressure from advertisement companies and stockholders, which increasingly 
determine what content may be shown and what content has to be regarded as inappropriate. This  
process has been made possible through the marketization of Chinese media, initiated in the 1980s  
and 90s. Self-censorship and pressure from the site of private companies has confined what Chinese 
media may report on today, so there is no need for a direct implementation of internet censorship by  
the Chinese state.
As has been shown in chapter three Chinese internet users are also more likely to censor them-
selves. Because users are not sure on whether they are being monitored or not, many choose to re-
strict themselves not to get into trouble with the government. Some topics are evaded consciously, 
like discussion about taboo topics like Taiwan and Tiananmen, but other topics are evaded more or  
less subconsciously. Because netizens think the government is capable of deleting any content not  
compliant with norms and customs, many give up the search for possibly forbidden content, even 
though it still can be found without any problem. Insecurity is what makes self-censorship most ef-
fective. Like companies, users only vaguely know about what topics are taboo and therefore choose 
to restrict themselves.
Countermeasures against censorship are also known among Chinese citizens, but they are not 
generally used. The fear of becoming subject of investigation induces users to avoid using well-
known methods to circumvent blocks. Many internet users are also not interested in politics, but are 
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more concerned with news about stars and other kind of soft news, distracting themselves from 
problematic news and discussions, that could possibly get them into trouble with the authorities.
The thesis has proven how internet censorship takes place through a panoptical mechanism, 
and how this mechanism is still valid. It may be argued that self-censorship is as imperfect as the 
Great Firewall, because there will always be people who cannot be controlled this way, 171 but in 
my opinion this does not prove that the concept of Panopticism cannot be applied to internet censor -
ship in the PRC. Dissident opinions are tolerated to a certain degree, because as long as only small 
groups or individuals break free from the censorship the rule of the CCP will not be threatened. As 
long as the masses are kept under control by collective self-censorship and self-seduction a technic-
ally perfect control of content is not necessary.
It is difficult to make any assumptions on the coming development of internet censorship in the 
PRC, but in my opinion this strategy will not change in the short run. Interviews have shown that 
young internet users have internalised the slogans of the Party, therefore an outcry for more free-
dom of speech and less content control is unlikely to be heard in the near future.
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